The FBCA Testing and the EMA Challenge

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Problem

- Agency PKIs are developed as independent trust domains
 - initially designed to support intra-agency applications
- Goal: Support interagency PKI interoperability
 - technical interoperability
 - policy interoperability

Background

- FBCA is non-hierarchical, peer-to-peer "hub" - not a "root"
- Supports interagency PKI technical interoperability by establishing certification paths
- Supports policy interoperability as determined by the FPKI Policy Authority
- Intended to accommodate Federal agency use of any PKI COTS product

Federal Bridge Certification Authority


- Current Status
- Testing and Demonstration
- Participants
- Results
- Conclusions and lessons learned
- Remaining challenges

Current Status


- Prototype FBCA operational 2/8/00
 - GSA auspices; hosted by Mitretek Systems
 - Entrust and Cybertrust CAs
 - PeerLogic i500 directory
 - Supports EMA Challenge and testing
- Production FBCA operational late 2000
 - Additional CA products within membrane
 - Mesh arrangement within membrane

Test Structure

- Six disparate PKI domains cross-certified with FBCA
 - Five different CA products
 - Five different X.500 directory products
- Interoperability demonstrated via exchange of signed S/MIME messages
- X.500 directory framework chaining between directories, client access via LDAP



Directory Configuration



Client Details

- Eudora engineered with:
 - Entrust toolkit ("out of the box")
 - CygnaCom libraries
 - JGVanDyke libraries
- Spyrus LYNKS cryptocards for CygnaCom/JGVanDyke enabled client
- Private key on hard disk for Entrust enabled client

Participants

- Government of Canada
- NSA/DOD
- NIST
- NASA
- **GSA**
- Georgia Tech Research Institute

- CA products: Entrust; Cybertrust; CygnaCom; Spyrus; Motorola
- <u>Directories</u>: PeerLogic; ICL; Nexor; CDS; Chromatix
- Integrators: Mitretek;
 JGVanDyke; GNS; Booz
 Allen; CygnaCom; A&N
 Associates

Results

From	NIST	NIST	DOD	DOD	DOD	Canada	GTRI	NASA	GSA
To	CA#1	CA#2	Entrust	Spyrus	Mot.				
NIST	NA								CUD
CA#1									
NIST		NA							CUD
CA#2			111111						
DOD			NA	NA	NA				CUD
Entrust									
DOD			NA	NA	NA				CUD
Spyrus									
DOD			NA	NA	NA				CUD
Mot.									
Canada				DEB	DEB	NA			CUD
GTRI							NA		CUD
NASA				DEB	DEB			NA	CUD
		<i></i>							
GSA	CUD	CUD	CUD	CUD	CUD	CUD	CUD	CUD	CUD

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

- FBCA concept works
- Client ability to develop and process trust path straightforward to implement
- Directory interoperability is <u>critical</u> to PKI interoperability
- Directory entries must line up with CAs
- Lots of details, lots of devils

Challenges Ahead For the FBCA

- Continue testing
 - Achieve interoperability between all domains
 - Test encryption and policy mapping
- Proceed to develop production FBCA
 - Stand up FPKI Policy Authority under Federal CIO Council
- Vendor Outreach
 - Need ubiquitous support for trust path creation and processing